Search results for "Shapley value"

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures

2019

International audience; This paper deals with Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on specific union stable systems given by the winning coalitions derived from a voting game. This framework allows for analyzing new and real situations in which there exists a feedback between the economic influence of each coalition of agents and its political power. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Harsanyi power solutions on the subclass of union stable systems arisen from the winning coalitions from a voting game when the influence is determined by a power index. In particular, we establish comparable axiomatizations, in this context, when co…

SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH

1998

Values of games with probabilistic graphs

1999

Abstract In this paper we consider games with probabilistic graphs. The model we develop is an extension of the model of games with communication restrictions by Myerson (1977) . In the Myerson model each pair of players is joined by a link in the graph if and only if these two players can communicate directly. The current paper considers a more general setting in which each pair of players has some probability of direct communication. The value is defined and characterized in this context. It is a natural extension of the Myerson value and it turns out to be the Shapley value of a modified game.

On Ibn Ezra's Procedure and Shapley Value

2014

We examine ibn Ezra's procedure (Rabinovitch 1973; O'Neill 1982) historically used to solve the Rights Arbitration problem in the general framework of bankruptcy problems. When the greatest claim is larger than or equal to the estate, the procedure is a maximal game (Aumann 2010). However, when the greatest claim is smaller than the estate, the axioms of efficiency (the whole estate is distributed) and satiation are difficult to satisfy simultaneously. We discuss both axioms to show that their importance and necessity are radically different. From then, for the part of the estate not covered by the greatest claim, we examine four possible procedures: the minimal overlap rule, Alcalde et al.…

Risk assessment and profit sharing in business networks

2011

Abstract Nowadays network is the preferred governance form to conduct economic transactions. Network solution allows to reach flexibility maintaining cost and quality level. Since network concept refers to a great variety of organizational hybrids it is possible to choose the one that fits better market requirements. The new trends in inter-organization relationships push towards network solutions: companies are interested in relationships with partners and customers to overcome resource dependence, to enter too risky market or simply differentiate their business portfolio. The proposed research focuses on the network concept aiming at highlighting threats and opportunities to investigate t…

THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE

2013

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.

Three Wives Problem and Shapley Value

2014

We examine the Talmudic three wives problem, which is a generalization of the Talmudic contested garment problem solved by Aumann and Maschler (1985) using coalitional procedure. This problem has many practical applications. In an attempt to unify all Talmudic methods, Guiasu (2010, 2011) asserts that it can be explained in terms of “run-to-the-bank”, that is, of Shapley value in a “cumulative game”. It can be challenged because the coalitional procedure yields the same result as the nucleolus, which corresponds to a “dual game”. As Guiasu’s solution is paradoxical (it has all the appearances of truth), my contribution consists in explaining the concepts, particularly truncation, that play …

Redistribution of tax resources: a cooperative game theory approach

2021

AbstractWe consider the problem of how to distribute public expenditure among the different regions of an economic entity after all taxes have been collected. Typical examples are: the regions that make up a country, the states of a federal country, or the countries of a confederation of countries. We model the problem as a cooperative game in coalitional form, called the tax game. This game estimates the fiscal resources collected in each region, or coalition of regions, by differentiating between what comes from economic activity within each region and what comes from trade with the other regions. This methodology provides a measure of the disagreement within a region, or coalitions of re…

Responsive and Minimalist App Based on Explainable AI to Assess Palliative Care Needs during Bedside Consultations on Older Patients

2021

[EN] Palliative care is an alternative to standard care for gravely ill patients that has demonstrated many clinical benefits in cost-effective interventions. It is expected to grow in demand soon, so it is necessary to detect those patients who may benefit from these programs using a personalised objective criterion at the correct time. Our goal was to develop a responsive and minimalist web application embedding a 1-year mortality explainable predictive model to assess palliative care at bedside consultation. A 1-year mortality predictive model has been trained. We ranked the input variables and evaluated models with an increasing number of variables. We selected the model with the seven …

Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and selforganization in social networks

2007

We study the formation of social networks that are based on local interaction and simple rule following. Agents evaluate the profitability of link formation on the basis of the Myerson-Shapley principle that payoffs come from the marginal contribution they make to coalitions. The NP-hard problem associated with the Myerson-Shapley value is replaced by a boundedly rational 'spatially' myopic process. Agents consider payoffs from direct links with their neighbours (level 1), which can include indirect payoffs from neighbours' neighbours (level 2) and up to M-levels that are far from global. Agents dynamically break away from the neighbour to whom they make the least marginal contribution. Com…